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1 Introduction
Developing country financial crises in the 1990s
and early 2000s were significant. However, in
many cases, recovery tended to be relatively fast,
because developing countries could export their
way out of the crisis. The global nature of the
current financial crisis and its wide ranging
impacts through multiple channels such as trade,
finance and remittances, greatly reduces the
options available.
This article examines what policy choices
developing countries have to protect their
national incomes and mitigate the impacts on
the poor. It addresses questions such as: how able
are countries to respond to the crisis? If exports
are not an option in the short term, how much
fiscal space do they have to stimulate their
economies and support expansion of social
protection mechanisms? Where the latter do not
exist or are too precarious, are there effective
ways to protect the poor and the most
vulnerable? What is the best expenditure
strategy to ensure that recovery is sustainable in
the long term?
The article highlights the fact that although
virtually all developing countries have been hit
by the global financial crisis, their ability to
respond differs, in some cases quite considerably.
A number of middle-income countries have
foreign exchange and fiscal space to mitigate the
effects of the crisis, but low-income countries
(LICs) do not have the resources to cushion the
macroeconomic shock. The article also argues
that, given the limited choices available due to
the global nature of the crisis, countries have to
find innovative ways out of the crisis. The article
also highlights what in previous crises has
worked well – for instance, counter-cyclical
mechanisms such as automatic stabilisers, which
helped protect the most vulnerable, and large-
scale external financing packages, which have
been critical in helping countries recover fast.
The article first describes the impacts of the
crisis on different groups of developing countries.
It next discusses the different degrees of
preparedness among countries, and then what
policy choices are available. It ends with a set of
policy recommendations for the international
community to help developing countries weather
the downturn.
2 Crisis impacts: what channels matter most?
Developing countries have been hit by the
financial crisis through different channels:
financial (private capital), trade, aid and
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remittances (transfers of money from workers
abroad to their home countries). However,
developing countries form a very large and
heterogeneous group. They differ from each
other by how they are integrated in the world
economy and their initial macroeconomic
conditions. Thus, for each country or group of
countries, some channels matter more than
others. Moreover, countries’ initial conditions
and response capacity can also change very
quickly, depending on how exposed the economy
is and measures undertaken in response to the
previous financial crises.
The financial channel has already affected those
emerging market economies that have recently
attracted large amounts of private capital. The
capital reversal has been sudden and ample, and
is forecast to intensify in 2009 (see Figure 1),
which also shows that official flows operate in a
counter-cyclical way: every time private flows
recede official flows increase, and vice-versa.
Moreover, the cost of raising international
capital has gone up, as emerging market’s
sovereign (government-issued) bonds are seen as
more ‘risky’ by international investors. The
effects on the domestic economies of emerging
markets have varied depending on which sectors
were more exposed to foreign capital. In Korea,
banks had borrowed heavily and faced difficulty
in renewing international bank loans, with knock
on effects on domestic credit markets. In Brazil,
non-financial large companies had large foreign
debts. Also, some companies were on the wrong
side of hedging positions – that is, betting on
further domestic currency appreciation. This, in
turn, has reduced domestic banks’ willingness to
lend to these companies. In Eastern Europe,
many countries have large current account
deficits and thus are having to consider resorting
to IMF loans. In early 2009, the IMF had already
approved emergency loans to Hungary, Ukraine,
Belarus and Latvia (IMF 2009c).
Although emerging economies were initially
affected by the financial channel, as recession
has set in within the developed world, global
trade has collapsed (particularly since the last
quarter of 2008), thereby strongly affecting
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Figure 1 Net private and official flows to emerging market economies*
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Source Authors’ elaboration, based on data from the Institute of International Finance (IIF).
*Flows to 28 emerging economies from emerging Asia, Latin America, emerging Europe and Africa/Middle East.
e: estimate; f: forecast.
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economic performance in emerging economies,
especially from East Asia where exports are a
major driver of growth. The World Economic
Outlook of April 2009 reports a decline in
developing Asia output growth from 10.6 per
cent in 2007 to 7.7 per cent in 2008. For all
developing countries, the growth decline was less
pronounced – from 8.3 to 6.1 per cent.
Less exposed to international capital flows, low-
income countries have been affected by reduced
external demand and falling commodity prices.1
Thus, the real channels have been of far greater
importance.
Unlike in emerging economies where the
banking systems tend to be susceptible to the
international capital flows, the financial sectors
in LICs are less exposed to these flows.
Therefore, despite the international crisis, on
the whole banks remain solid (with high capital
ratios and low non-performing loan ratios) and
maintain their lending at pre-crisis levels.
(However, as growth slows down in LICs due to
the trade shock, banks’ balance sheets in these
countries will likely deteriorate and therefore
affect credit supply to the economy.)
Notwithstanding the above, the following
remarks are in order. First, a few LICs are
exposed to private flows due to capital account
liberalisation, with foreign credit feeding
domestic markets. A recent IMF document
reports that this has been the case in countries
such as Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and
Zambia.2 Also, some countries such as Ghana
and Sri Lanka have been able to raise finance in
the international capital markets (IMF 2009b: 9).
These countries are therefore vulnerable to the
capital flows reversal.
Second, trade finance to low-income countries
declined by 18 per cent in the final quarter of
2008, thereby affecting countries such as
Lesotho, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (IMF 2009b: 12).
Third, FDI to low-income countries is forecast to
decline sharply – by nearly 20 per cent in 2009
(IMF 2009b). The amount of FDI that LICs
attract is, in a considerable number of cases,
significant when measured as a proportion of
their GDPs.3
In addition to the trade shock and reduction in
private capital flows, LICs are also suffering from
declining remittances, which in some cases are
larger than their export values and account for a
large portion of their external financing needs.
For the year 2009, a World Bank study forecasts
remittances to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to fall
by 1.3 per cent (Ratha et al. 2008). Remittances
help a country meet its foreign exchange needs,
but also have a critical micro dimension, as they
constitute a vital income source for households
with relatives working abroad. Unlike in previous
crises when remittances tended to counteract the
worst effects, this time their decline is reinforcing
the plight of the poor.
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Figure 2 Grants as proportion of total current expenditures: aid dependent countries in SSA*
Source Authors’ elaboration based on various IMF country reports.
*Average calculations based on 19 sub-Saharan African countries identified as aid-dependent.
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Finally, many low-income countries are aid-
dependent, which means they need foreign aid to
meet their balance of payments needs and to
finance a large part of their public expenditures4
– in some countries, foreign aid accounts for over
50 per cent of their total current expenditures
(see Figure 2).5
If aid flows do not increase or are curtailed, these
countries will have to promote drastic
adjustments, thereby reversing progress made in
recent years, in terms of growth acceleration and
poverty reduction. These countries have far lower
foreign reserves compared with the emerging
economies (Figure 3). In some countries, reserves
have been already depleted due to the oil and
food shocks, and the fact that little or no
additional official assistance was made available
to help them deal with such shocks.
3 How prepared are developing countries to
withstand the financial crisis?
A country’s ability to respond to the crisis differs
considerably. Many emerging economies in Latin
America and Asia, which have suffered from
volatile international capital flows (see Figure 1),
have learned to reduce their exposure to shocks
and build capacity response by undertaking
cautionary fiscal policy, reducing public debt,
accumulating foreign reserves and adopting
more flexible exchange rate regimes. As a
consequence, they are in a stronger
macroeconomic position and have some room to
draw their own policy responses to minimise the
economic and social effects of the crisis.
However, their starting points and amount of
progress made have been uneven. In Latin
America, despite a good record in recent years,
countries such as Brazil still have somewhat
limited space for expansionary fiscal policy,
because of initially large public debt. Other
countries such as Chile and Peru benefited from
the recent primary commodity boom and saved a
substantial portion of the windfall (Gottschalk
and Prates 2006). In Asia, countries such as
Malaysia and Thailand have historically
maintained fiscal balance and thus have more
power to implement large stimulus packages.
China’s large-scale stimulus package has been
widely announced, but many other Asian
economies such as Singapore, South Korea and
Taiwan also have fiscal space and are undertaking
strong expansionary policy (see UN-DESA 2009;
The Economist 2009). On the monetary front, the
level of private savings, relatively low in Latin
America but high in East Asia, is another key
difference among countries. In principle, this gives
monetary policy in Asia more power to stimulate
domestic private spending (The Economist 2009).
For Asian countries, expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies to stimulate domestic demand
are critical to compensate for the sharp slowdown
in exports, on which they are heavily dependent.
International reserves are an additional policy tool,
which can be used to help avoid excessive
depreciation in the domestic currency, and thus
negative impacts on financial and non-financial
companies facing large currency mismatches in
their balance sheets. Also, foreign reserves can be
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Figure 3 Level of international reserves, for different groups of developing countries (2007)
Source Authors’ elaboration, based on IMF World Economic Outlook 2008 and various IMF country reports.
used to finance larger current account deficits
arising from expansionary fiscal and monetary
policies. However, while in some countries reserves
reflect past current account surpluses (e.g. China,
Korea, Malaysia), in others such as India these are
mainly ‘borrowed reserves’ – that is, reserves
resulting from large net positive capital flows
despite the occurrence of large current account
deficits (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2008). For the
latter group, the room for expansionary policies is
considerably more limited.
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Table 1 Vulnerability indicators for SSA aid-dependent countries and LIC groupings*†
Country/Group Debt CA balance Reserves in Fiscal deficit Main export Vulnerability
as % GDP as % GDP months of % GDP as % total Xs Index
imports
Burkina Faso 19 –11.5 5.4 –5.7 0.715 0.257
Burundi 127 –12 3.3 0.5 0.246 0.518
Cape Verde 55 –11.6 3.4 –0.7 0.489 0.406
Congo DR 87 –10.7 0.4 –0.7 0.588
Ethiopia 11 –4.3 1.5 –3.1 0.328 0.376
The Gambia 44 –12.1 3.8 0.2 0.256 0.376
Ghana 37 –9.8 1.7 –9.1 0.251 0.446
Guinea-Bissau 235 7 7.4 –10.3 0.333
Madagascar 25 –27.4 2.5 –2.8 0.141 0.527
Malawi 17 –2.9 1.9 –3.4 0.138 0.354
Mali 22 –7.5 5.4 –3.1 0.487 0.231
Mauritania 57 –8.6 3.4 –2.0 0.686 0.385
Mozambique 52 –11.3 4.2 –3.8 0.629 0.361
Niger 14 –9.7 3.4 –1.0 0.632 0.331
Rwanda 15 –9.5 4.9 –1.5 0.215 0.260
S. Tome Principe 70 –36.1 6.2 0.872 0.484
Sierra Leone 17 –6.4 3.4 25.2 0.310
Tanzania 34 –9.7 4.3 –4.1 0.259 0.318
Uganda 13 –7.7 6.4 –1.0 0.199 0.171
Zambia 6 –5.5 3 –0.6 0.711 0.306
SSA aid dependent 47.9 –10.4 3.8 –3.0 0.367
All LICs 48 –7.7 4.2 0.327
SSA 55 –7.7 4.3 0.333
Asia 37 –6.7 4 0.313
Source Authors’ elaboration, based on data from IMF (2009b), IMF country reports, and UN International Trade
Statistics Yearbook 2007.
*The vulnerability index is based on three macroeconomic indicators: debt to GDP ratio, current account deficit and
level of reserves in months of imports. The data are based on IMF projections for 2008.
†Fiscal data are from various IMF country reports for the year 2007; country export data are for the latest year
available in the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook 2007.
3.1 What about low-income countries?
In contrast to the emerging economies, low-
income countries do not have their own resources
to smooth consumption and support recovery.
Table 1 displays a number of vulnerability
indicators for LICs as a whole, for SSA and Asian
LICs, and for the aid-dependent countries in SSA.
It shows that, for these groups of LICs, debt as a
proportion of GDP is fairly high, the current
account balance very large and level of reserves in
months of imports, low. Table 1 also shows that
SSA aid-dependent countries are particularly
vulnerable, scoring poorly in each indicator.
Moreover, it shows that the aid-dependent
countries have a narrow export base – in many
cases, their main export product accounts for
over 50 per cent of their total exports.
Figure 4 shows a vulnerability index for all the
20 aid-dependent countries in SSA plus different
groups of low-income countries.6
It can be seen from Figure 4 and Table 1 that,
among the SSA aid-dependent countries, Congo
DR, Madagascar and Burundi exhibit the highest
level of vulnerability, due to high debt levels and
large current account deficits. Uganda and Mali
look the least vulnerable due to low debt levels,
but their current accounts are very large.
In the past, aid-dependent countries have
suffered from trade shocks, which led to
deceleration or even decline in domestic
economic activities, with effects on governments’
commodities and tax revenues. In this context,
aid tended to stand as a more resilient source of
government receipts, thereby benefiting
countries that relied heavily on aid to finance
public expenditures. However, in the current
crisis these countries have aid as a potential
additional source of vulnerability, due to the
uncertainties regarding the future trajectories of
aid flows. If aid declines, they will suffer severe
budgetary and balance of payments constraints.
A further vulnerability dimension associated
with aid is that some countries, such as
Mozambique, are highly dollarised, due to aid
flows. A sharp currency depreciation following an
external shock may benefit the government
budget that relies heavily on aid, but the balance
sheets from the private sector suffer a great deal.
In some countries banking regulators learned
from previous crises to put in place a regulatory
framework aimed at reducing large currency
mismatches in banks’ balance sheets. However, it
is far more difficult to avoid such mismatches
among non-financial companies, which makes
banks that lend to such companies exposed to
credit risk.
A closely related notion to the concept of
vulnerability is a country’s capacity to respond,
or the fiscal space it has to promote stimulus
policies, as mentioned earlier. A World Bank
(2008) study indicates that of 18 countries that
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Figure 4 Vulnerability index*
Source Authors’ elaboration, based on data from IMF (2009b).
*The vulnerability index is based on three macroeconomic indicators: debt to GDP ratio, current account deficit and
level of reserves in months of imports. The data are based on IMF projections for the year 2008.
we identify as aid-dependent in sub-Saharan
Africa, ten have ‘low fiscal space’, while the other
eight are considered either as having ‘some fiscal
space’ or ‘more fiscal space’.7 However, this may
give a false sense of space, as it assumes aid will
be forthcoming, which is far from guaranteed in
the current crisis context.8 While Table 1
indicates that some countries have fairly small
and therefore manageable fiscal deficits,
Figure 5 shows how much larger these countries’
fiscal deficits are when external grants are
excluded – on average, the increase is from 3.0 to
10.6 per cent of the countries’ GDPs. For them,
such grants finance 27 per cent of their total
fiscal expenditure.9
4 How important is fiscal space in this crisis?
In the 1990s and early 2000s, crisis-hit countries
suffered massive currency devaluations, which
caused severe balance sheet problems within
their economies. At the same time, devaluation
encouraged exports and thereby helped
countries recover relatively fast. However, the
global nature of the current crisis implies that
external demand for developing country exports
is declining. Therefore, these countries need to
find alternative stimulus to support recovery. In
this context, fiscal space becomes critical.
But, while stimulus policies can be made possible
by fiscal space, they are not limited by it. For
example, a country may have limited fiscal
space, but still some room for monetary policy
stimulus where inflation is declining (UN-DESA
2009). Due to falling fuel and food prices and the
prospect of weaker levels of economic activity,
inflation is projected to fall worldwide. Among
developing countries, IMF projections indicate a
decline in inflation from 10.4 per cent in 2008 to
5.5 per cent in 2009 (IMF 2009a). Moreover,
countries can use financial policies to stimulate
their economies. Thus, where fiscal space is
limited, countries can:
z Consider alternative options such as monetary
easing to stimulate the domestic economy, a
response strategy that lower inflation allows.
z Strive to enhance the country’s revenue-
raising capacity provided it does not harm
domestic private demand.
z Use public banks to direct credit to the small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the poor.
Gottschalk with Bolton Macroeconomic Policy, Stimuli, Aid and Budgeting: What Options?84
Figure 5 Fiscal deficit of aid-dependent countries in SSA (percentage of GDP, 2007)†
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Source Author’s elaboration, based on data from various IMF country reports.
†Figures for Congo DR are from 2006.
z Use limited available public resources to
target the poor (Ravallion 2008).
4.1 What have we learned from the previous crises?
We have learned that counter-cyclical
mechanisms can be used to protect the poor and
the most vulnerable. For example, during its
1998 crisis, Russia increased transfers through
its pension system (Lokshin and Ravallion 2000).
Unfortunately, such stabilisers are not a common
feature, especially among low-income countries,
but other mechanisms of a counter-cyclical
nature or in the form of social protection may be
available.
Price stabilisation funds constitute an important
counter-cyclical mechanism for dealing with price
shocks. These funds have been created by
countries where total government receipts are
overly dependent on commodity revenues, and
therefore bound to exhibit volatile behaviour.
Angola’s Oil Reserve Fund, Burkina Faso’s Cotton
Support Fund, Chile’s Copper Compensation
Fund and Nigeria’s Excess Crude Account are a
few examples of funds that have been created to
help smooth out governments’ expenditures over
time. Burkina Faso’s fund played an important
role in the past when cotton prices fell sharply in
2001–02 (See IMF 2002). Drawing on its copper
fund, Chile is currently implementing a large
fiscal stimulus package, designed to take the form
of a 10 per cent increase in public expenditure in
2009, nearly half of it targeted to public works and
handouts for the most vulnerable (Martinez
2009). Unfortunately, export commodity
dependent countries that have such funds in place
are few, making external assistance to deal with
shock indispensable.
Similar to automatic stabilisers and stabilisation
funds, social protection mechanisms are not
widespread or with extensive coverage in the
developing world, but a few cases stand out.
Brazil and Mexico have successful cash transfer
programmes that can be scaled up to protect
those failing into poverty. Countries lacking such
mechanisms can invest in infrastructure and
undertake public work programmes (Ravallion
2008). Previous crises have also shown that the
most vulnerable were the least likely to adopt
effective coping strategies, indicating the need
for targeted use of limited public resources. This
requires adaptability and flexibility in terms of
instruments available.10
At the same time, maintaining public
investments is also very important for sustained
recovery. In previous crises, these were
drastically reduced, thereby undermining post-
crisis long-term growth. Research by the
National Institute of Economic and Social
Research shows that fiscal stimulus spent on
productive investment raises the level of output
by 1.5 per cent in the long term (Barrell et al.
2009). To address the potential tension between
short-term social needs and long-term growth,
financing from regional multilateral banks and
other types of regional funds (possibly by larger
countries with higher spending capacity) might
be a possible way forward. It could be made
available for public investment, thereby helping
free up domestic budgetary resources for poverty
alleviation.
Previous crises have also shown that IMF-led
financial packages can play a critical role in
helping avoid too deep a crisis and supporting
rapid recovery (as in Mexico’s crisis of 1994–5
and Brazil’s in early 1999). These packages were
successful because resources were large,
frontloaded and with reasonable conditionality
attached.
5 Policy recommendations
Given the scale of the crisis, developing country
governments should use not one but a range of
economic and financial policy instruments, in
addition to social protection mechanisms to
combat the downturn and protect the poor.
Where fiscal space is limited, space has to be
sought elsewhere, for example in the monetary
and financial policy areas. Space is particularly
limited among LICs. Moreover, most such
countries are under IMF sponsored Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)
programmes, whose principal features include
very low inflation targets, stress on budget
balance, pro-poor focus but lack of pro-growth
expenditure and absence of flexibility to deal
with shocks (Gottschalk 2008). In this context, it
is important that countries fight for space for
stimulus policies, for example by increasing
inflation and budget deficit targets. Countries
with greater government capacity may be able to
gain space but others, especially those emerging
from conflict and therefore lacking capacity,
need donor support for more flexibility in
macroeconomic policy management to tackle the
crisis.
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Post-September 2008 trends in international
private capital flows to developing countries
point towards a sombre picture, with sharp
declines in all forms of flows, as seen earlier. This
is compounded by declines in export revenues
and private remittances as well. Thus, although
this article focuses on country-level policies to
address the crisis, external resources are critical.
At the London Summit in early April 2009, the
G-20 re-affirmed its pledge to increase
substantially the amount of financial resources
to help developing countries cushion the effects
of crisis. The promised amount is fairly large, of
over U$S1 trillion. If this promise materialises, a
lot can be achieved in terms of helping countries
mitigate the crisis’ growth and poverty impacts.
However, a number of issues and uncertainties
stand in the way.
First, it is unclear how much of the promised
resources are entirely new, and exactly what
form these will take. Second, it is unclear the
timeframe (and within it the speed) for their
disbursement, which is a very important aspect,
especially in view of the fact that the crisis
effects are already being felt by the poor (see
Hossain, this IDS Bulletin). Speed of resource
disbursement is also important because it helps
halt the feedback effects deepening the crisis.
Third, it is still unclear as to through what
institutions and mechanisms different types of
promised resources will be disbursed. Moreover,
no concrete plans have been made to reform
existing mechanisms that, to date, have worked
poorly. Finally, although promised resources
seem large, most of it if eventually disbursed will
likely be directed to the emerging economies. Of
the total, US$50 billion have been promised to
LICs, but, again, with little said about when or
how they will be disbursed.
Regarding the emerging economies, which in
principle are the main beneficiaries of the
promised resources, two issues arises. First, a
large amount of the promised resources are
intended to be channelled through the IMF.
Although the IMF has created a new lending
facility – the Flexible Credit Line (FCL),
designed to frontload large funds with no strings
attached, few countries will likely be eligible for
this facility, given the pre-conditions these
countries have to meet. This will leave out many
emerging economies and middle-income
countries, which will have to apply to the high-
conditionality type of IMF lending facilities.
Disappointingly, although the G-20 represents a
new, wider composition of forces and interests,
this has not as yet been translated into new
guidelines for an IMF policy shift in its lending
facilities away from excessive emphasis on
economic adjustment and towards more pro-
growth goals.
Second, it seems that, among developing
countries, the emerging economies and other
middle-income countries are those most affected
by the decline in trade credit by international
private banks. However, there is lack of clarity of
how the promised increase in trade credit will be
distributed between multilateral development
banks and bilateral export credit agencies. This
is an important point due to the latter’s track
record in allocating credit according to donor’s
trade interests.
But the LICs may stand as the losers of the
London Summit, if no further action to help them
is undertaken. Even if honoured, the Summit
pledges will fall well short of the financing needs
facing LICS, once the effects of the world
slowdown are fully felt by this group of countries.
Moreover, the Summit was vague as to how the
promised concessional resources will be
channelled. The spring meetings in late April did
bring more concrete plans, including the
intention by the World Bank to frontload its
International Development Association (IDA)
resources. However, more resources by the donor
community should be made available to further
enhance the IMF and World Bank concessional
lending capacity and ensure funds are not lacking
for post-crisis years. Moreover, no concrete plans
to reform the IMF existing concessional lending
facilities such as the PRGF and the Exogenous
Shock Facility (ESF) have been laid out.
It is expected that, between the G20 meeting in
April and the next meeting scheduled for the
latter part of 2009, some of the action and policy
gaps identified above are filled. Concretely,
efforts should be made to:
z Expand the coverage of the IMF FCL, so that
it can be accessed by a larger number of
countries. In addition, the conditions attached
to the traditional IMF lending facilities should
be softened with a shift in emphasis towards
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growth recovery policies, as these facilities will
be needed to assist those countries seeking for
help but which will not eligible for the FCL.
z Clearly identify what institutions will be
charged with channelling increased trade
credit, and in doing so, preferably prioritise
multilateral and regional banks over export
credit agencies.
z Increase subsidy resources to the IMF-based
funds that underpin the existing mechanisms,
such as the ESF and the PRGF, for dealing
with economic shocks. Moreover, it is
important that these mechanisms are
substantially reformed, to scale up resources
made available, reduce conditionality and
increase speed of disbursement.
z Support the creation of a new shocks financing
architecture. While the existing shocks
financing mechanisms should be modified now
so that they are effective in responding to the
current crisis, in the medium term the
international community should seek to create
a new shocks financing architecture that
follows a more holistic approach. That is, an
approach whereby a larger pool of funds is
created and the same fund can be used for
different types of shocks. In her article in this
IDS Bulletin Hossain shows it is fairly common
that external shocks overlap with national
crises (linked to political conflict; natural
disasters). A holistic approach also responds to
demands from policy makers from countries
that tend to be affected by multiple shocks
simultaneously, as previous studies have found
(see, e.g. Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk 2005).
z Complement the IMF and the World Bank
roles with that of the regional development
banks, in providing counter-cyclical lending,
which can be used for public investment to
enhance long-term growth. Also at the
regional level, initiatives such as those from
the East Asian countries to create a large pool
of funds to combat the crisis should be
expanded and replicated in other regions,
where large financing capacity for pooling
resources exist.
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Notes
* This article is based on an earlier version
prepared for the UK Department for
International Development (DFID). We are
thankful to Andy Sumner and Neil McCulloch
for their comments on an earlier version of
this article. The usual caveats apply.
1 In the second half of 2008, non-energy commodity
prices fell 38 per cent (World Bank 2009).
2 The IMF (2009b) considers LICs those
countries that are PRGF eligible (78 countries
in total). It therefore includes countries that,
according to the World Bank classification, are
considered middle-income countries instead.
3 IMF (2009b) projections for the LICs indicate
that FDI to GDP ratio was at 7.0 in 2008. But
this figure is a simple average and therefore
biased upwards by high FDI to GDP ratios
from small island countries.
4 Aid-dependent countries are defined here as
those with average aid to Gross National
Income (GNI) ratio of at least 10 per cent
over the years 2000–06. This article identifies
20 sub-Saharan African countries as aid
dependent: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape
Verde, Congo DR, Ethiopia, The Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger,
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra
Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
5 The grants to current expenditure ratio for
19 countries for which data are available are
on average 54 per cent.
6 Our vulnerability index comprises three
macroeconomic indicators: debt to GDP ratio,
current account deficit and level of reserves in
months of imports. The data are based on
IMF projections for the year 2008. It is the
simple average of a standard formula index
(i.e. index = (actual-minimum)/(maximum-
minimum)), used among others by the UN for
their Human Development Index (HDI).
Other crisis-related studies have produced
similar indexes for the closely related concept
of fiscal capacity. The World Bank has
produced a fiscal capacity index comprising
debt/GDP, current account balance,
international reserves and reversible capital
inflows (see World Bank 2008). A recent
UNESCO study also produced a fiscal capacity
indicator comprising budget deficit,
government debt to GDP ratio, revenue to
GDP and aid to GDP. See UNESCO (2009).
7 The World Bank study categorises countries
as having ‘low fiscal space’, ‘some fiscal space’
and ‘more fiscal space’ by averaging
standardised indexes of debt/GDP, fiscal
deficit, current account balance, international
reserves and reversible capital inflows, over
the years 2002–07.
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8 Fiscal space can be defined as the existence of
fiscal room for increased spending, without
jeopardising the government’s fiscal
sustainability (Heller 2005).
9 Author’s calculations based on figures from
various IMF country reports.
10 For a review of different household coping
strategies in crisis situations, see Gottschalk
(2004).
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